Why does the economy keep falling into recession, and why don’t most economists see it coming?
In this thought-provoking conversation, Chris Casey of WindRock Wealth Management breaks down the real cause of recessions: central banks. Drawing on the Austrian School of Economics, Casey argues that artificially low interest rates and explosive monetary expansion fuel malinvestment and set the stage for inevitable downturns. He explains why mainstream economists and even Fed officials often have no coherent theory of the business cycle, and why their repeated interventions actually guarantee the next crisis.
Chris and Maggie Lake also walk through the top indicators to watch, like money supply, the yield curve, and credit spreads, and share how investors should position themselves in this uncertain phase of the business cycle.
Get to Know Chris Casey: His Journey, Strategy, and Financial Philosophy: https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=l2DdcqtoBYs
Volatility got you concerned? Get a free portfolio review with WindRock’s Chris Casey at https://bit.ly/43rdX11
Hard Assets Alliance – The Best Way to Invest in Gold and Silver: https://www.hardassetsalliance.com/?aff=WTH
Chris Casey 0:00
All we say is that recessions are caused by a central bank or some expansion of the money supply which artificially lowers interest rates. And that’s the key. That’s really the key.
Maggie Lake 0:15
Hello and welcome to wealthion. I’m Maggie Lake, and today Christopher Casey, Founder and Managing Director of wind rock wealth management, is joining me to break down the basics of the business cycle and how that impacts investment decisions. Hi, Chris, it’s great to have you back on Yeah. How you doing? Maggie, I’m doing well. And you know, there’s this huge debate happening right now as to whether the US is headed for a recession already in one everyone’s throwing all this data around to support the argument. So it seems like a good time to just check back in and talk about, why does this matter? Why should we care whether we’re in a recession or a technical recession?
Chris Casey 0:54
Well, it affects everybody, right? It affects you, whether you have a job, you’re an owner of a business, but affects everyone also in the standpoint of their investment portfolio. Recessions, I’d say, outside of war, are probably the greatest threat to certainly stock, if not the bond markets, and so everyone should be very concerned. And right now there is a lot of chatter. Are we entering a recession? Have we already entered one? Et cetera. What drives me crazy? Most people commenting on this have no theory or ideas to what causes it? In my mind, you have to identify causation until you start predicting it’s something. Otherwise you’re looking at tea leaves for the most part.
Maggie Lake 1:28
Yeah, and that does seem like a lot of what’s happening right now. Everyone has opinion, but we’re not sure what it’s based on. So what does cause business cycles? What is behind it? Well,
Chris Casey 1:38
there’s a number of theories out there. I subscribe to one called the Austrian theory of the business cycle. And any theory has to explain phenomena that we witness during a cycle and also during a recession, which is obviously part of the cycle, and it’s shocking. But a lot of people, if you ask, I go mainstream economists, you may hear someone on TV, and if they’re asked, what caused this recession, they always have a different reason, right? So, for instance, they may say, oh, eight was caused by Lehman Brothers or Bear Stearns, or, you know, the 2020 20 was obviously caused by the lockdowns, etc, but it’s always a disparate, discrete, different answer, instead of a fundamental theory. And if you don’t have a theory as to what’s giving to rise to all of them, then it’s a faulty theory. And the phenomena they have to explain, they have to explain. They have to explain a number of things they have to explain. For instance, why did the business cycle first appear in the 19th century? Right? That that’s a key, a key part of it. Before that, we have wars. We have, you know, occasional reception, recessions due to crop failures, whatever. But wasn’t a cycle. That’s something that’s important to note. The other aspect is the why it is a cycle, as I alluded to previously, you have to have a reason. Why is this recurring? Why? If it’s a pattern that we see, there another phenomena would be the cluster of error. So business people are trained to forecast, right? That’s pretty much all they do, day in, day out. They try to anticipate needs of consumers at all different levels, and a recession reveals that they’ve all been they’ve made some terrible decisions, terrible predictions. So why is that? Why is everyone failing? Because if anything, there’s a survivor bias in business, where the good forecasters remain right and the bad ones drop off. That’s another phenomenon that’s got to be explained. You also have to explain why every single recession is preceded by an expansion the economy. That’s at the same time you’re witnessing a vast expansion of the money supply. So there’s always a money supply increase before recession. We see that time and time again. And I’d say finally, the last phenomenon that you have to explain is you have to explain why cyclical companies are far more impacted than a consumer company. So these are, this is what has to be explained. And there’s a number of theories, but none of them really fits all those explanatory power of all those phenomena that we just described, except for the Austrian School. And that theory in particular, is pretty, pretty simple, which is actually, ironically, an argument against it. But all the Austrians, the Austrian School of Economics always say is that recessions are caused by a central bank or some expansion of the money supply, which artificially lowers interest rates. And that’s the key. That’s really the key. Interest rates are a key price that tells everybody in the economy that the division between capital and consumer goods. It’s not the price of money, which people typically say it’s the price of time, is what interest rates are. And when you distort that, you’ve now incentivized a vast number of economic actors, people, businesses, et cetera, to make malinvestments. They’re investing in things they otherwise would not have done but for lower interest rates. So that factory that, on paper, was not going to be profitable with lower interest rates, it suddenly is. And through this malinvestment, once the expansion of money supply ends or flat lines or even decreases, that’s when these decisions are revealed to be wasteful. They’re revealed to be malinvestments, and that is the recession that’s recessed. Cleansing periods, liquidation, it’s, it’s righting wrongs that have previously happened. That’s, that’s, in short, what the explanation of the Austrian school of economics, business theory, cycle theory, is. I love
Maggie Lake 5:12
that you sort of you make the point that, why are all these people making the wrong decision? I think we often wonder about that. So why, how did we get here? We should be able to avoid this. Why or do we find ourselves in this situation? And that makes sense if you look at it against the sort of, you know, the the interest rate veil of things that you could see why people would make those investments. So why are cyclicals impacted more? I mean, it can’t just be that their CFOs are, you know, more reckless? Why are they? Why do they feel it more? Why do some get hit more? Yeah,
Chris Casey 5:50
and a cyclical just for some audience members, referring to an economist, would call a higher order good type company, where they’re they’re making things, manufacturing things, creating things that are more distant from the ultimate consumer product than other companies. And so these type of companies are more heavily reliant upon interest rates and capital. You know these. Think construction, think mining, these. These are type of companies are heavily reliant and make really major decisions based on interest rates. So for instance, if you are a mining company, and you have, let’s say, a marginal silver mine in Mexico, and you’re going to Bring It Online only if interest rates are a certain percent, and then that percent increases, it proves to be unprofitable, that’s that’s a major decision. Interest rates are the key that permeate the entire economy.
Maggie Lake 6:40
So is it fair to say that they’re more sort of what we think capex intensive and have longer time projects? They’re less they’re less nimble on, say, a supply chain. They’ve got to, they’ve got to make an investment over a longer period of time. That’s why they’re more sensitive to the interest rates. Absolutely, that’s a large part of it. Yeah, interesting. So it’s interesting to think about this, because we’ve been we were for a long time in an environment of very artificially low interest rates, so we we maybe sort of lost some ability to understand this process, because we were sort of in this artificial period for a long time. And we’ll talk about all the malinvestment that may have come from that at a later date, but that that’s super interesting. So if that’s the case, okay, there are some different, different fundamentals, different different theories about why it happens. You subscribe to this one, but if it’s based on this, these understandings, why is Why is everyone always arguing about it? Why is everyone on the on a different page or getting it wrong and or, Why can’t people sort of anticipate that and protect against it? Why does it become a cycle that we can’t seem to break? Well, part
Chris Casey 7:54
of it is, this is going to sound shocking to some people, but fed, I’m talking Federal Reserve economists, people on the board right the Federal Reserve talking about treasury secretaries, in large part, they either A, do not have a theory. Is what causes recessions, business cycles, or B, they have a faulty theory. And it’s a faulty theory because whatever they subscribe to doesn’t explain this phenomena that we just listed. Now. That may seem shocking, but you don’t have to take my word for it, take the word of Federal Reserve Chairman, chairmans over the time, right? So we have, for instance, Ben Bernanke in 2002 Milton Friedman’s 90th birthday. He gave a speech. He said, thanks to you, Milton, we now know what causes recessions. It’s not going to happen anymore, right? Clearly, they were wrong. It’s 2002 in 2017 Janet Yellen gave a speech in which she said, we’ll never see a financial crisis again in my lifetime, our lifetime, I’m sorry, our lifetime. Okay, that would it didn’t take long to be proven false, right? January of 2008 Ben Bernanke is on, I think, was like CNBC, and he says, we’re not currently forecasting recession. We don’t anticipate any kind of recession. We’ve already seen. By the way, at that point you already saw major cracks in the economy, right? So they simply lack knowledge. Is what causes when you lack knowledge, you lack the ability to treat it. So it’s no different than someone comes in the ER, and they’ve they’re bleeding, or they got some issue. Well, the doctor refers to us to assess what’s wrong, what causes before they just start. So called treating you. Yes, they can put a tourniquet on, they can do some things. They’re obvious. But are obvious, but to really get to the root cause, they have to understand what, what created this. And these, these guys do not know, or they, or they have a faulty theory. Now, the reason it’s a pattern is because the implementation of their so called theory in reaction to recession is what makes it a pattern. So the main reason it’s a pattern is because every single recession we have, the federal government comes back. This is not US centric, right? This is pretty much worldwide, comes back with the same, what I call like the troika of trouble, right? They do three things. They have massive bailouts. They run massive deficits in the third one, which is really the key, is they start. Printing money, right? They start getting the printing presses. Everyone on in the stock market wants them to start lowering rates, which is just another way of goosing the money supply, right? So, and when you do that, you’ve started the whole cycle again. Because that’s, that’s ultimately what causes recession. When you go to it again as a cure, you’re really just creating the next recession down the road. Yeah,
Maggie Lake 10:19
you’re laying the groundwork. I just want to push back on a second, but you really think they don’t know? I mean, we, we have, you know, central banks full of PhDs. You can argue maybe they’re not, they’re not in touch with the sort of Main Street economy, but you have hugely talented people. You have people in hedge funds who get it wrong. I mean, they’re, they’re, they’re across the financial landscape. Do they really not know some of these theories?
Chris Casey 10:46
Absolutely. I mean, I even had dinner one time. I can’t say which with which one, but with a vice chair on the Federal Reserve years ago. They really don’t. Um, again, that sounds shocking, but either they don’t really have a theory, they’ll blame this or that. You know, for instance, like I said before, if you had mentioned 2008 they’ll blame like Lehman Brothers, right? That’s like me commenting on a California wildfire and saying, Oh, it started by this lightning strike, or this camp, this errant campfire, what have you. And it’s missing the whole point that it’s high winds. It’s under undergrowth that’s never been cleared out. It’s dry, temp, dry climate and temperatures, right? Those are the things they should be focusing on. But they’re not. They really don’t know. Because if they do have a theory, it’s one of two things. Typically it’s either one. It would be Keynesianism, which is following the theories of John Maynard Keynes as expressed in 1936 book, general theory. And this is such a convoluted book that’s really it’s difficult for anyone to interpret it or to decipher what he thinks causes recessions. In fact, one that there’s a great critique of it by Henry Hazlitt. And in summary, he said the book, there’s nothing original in it that’s true, because everything original was untrue, and everything true was not original, or they subscribe to like Ben Bernanke, the Freeman knight or monetarist School of what causes recessions. And they just blame. They also blame the Federal Reserve, but for different reasons. They blame the federal reserve for contracting the money supply. So they’re focused on, really what happens typically after the expansion during a recession. They pinpoint on the Federal Reserve, but for the wrong reason, and they blame like, for instance, Milton Friedman would call the Great Depression The Great contraction, contraction the money supply. So he’s close, but no cigar. He’s slightly off. And the problem there is that they identify a correlation without a causality. So they’ll talk about the my supply going down, they’ll talk about deflation, and they say that’s caused the recession, but they never connect those last two dots. How does deflation cause a recession? And it doesn’t. And for proof of this, all you need to do is look at US history. The two greatest expansions in economic in the economy under in the US, were roughly 18, you know, 30 to 1860, and 1870 to 1900 in both of those periods, the price level fell by half. That’s gonna sound shocking today’s age, but we had massive deflation over a multi decade period, and yet we had massive expansion of the economy. And so Friedman’s just wrong with that, that concept, and he never, he never even tries to really solidify or connect the dots in that theory, which is the major problem. So I would argue, as shocking as it says, Is it seems, yes, these people really don’t know what causes it, and frankly, don’t really seem like they care all that much.
Maggie Lake 13:33
There’s, I think that’s something that comes up time and time again, which makes it tricky to lay over these sort of traditional economic models. Is there? Always there. Always seems like something new is happening. So it’s like different this time, and that maybe those rules won’t apply. How do you grapple with that? You know, we’ve seen massive technological changes. We’ve seen massive financialization of the economy. We have all of these products, you know, some of which were involved in, in 2008 you know, if we look at, you know, bundled loans and things like that, and it always, it always makes people think that something’s happened that means that the original rules don’t apply. How do you wrap your head around that?
Chris Casey 14:15
Yeah, that’s, that’s a frequent argument, right? It’s this time, it’s different, right? That’s the mantra you always hear. But if the theory is correct, if recessions are caused by an expansion of the money supply, which artificially lowers interest rates, which causes malinvestment by various economic actors, none of those factors you just mentioned, including you could add a whole bunch, right? Like changing tastes, what have you, none of those affect that progression, that causality, none of that affects it. So yes, the economy is very different. Yes, people may be very different in sense of different tastes, et cetera, but ultimately it doesn’t matter. And we’ve seen this right, because a recession is a general decline in economic activity, not for a specific industry. So we’ve seen. We’ve seen the latter would be called an economic fluctuation, right? We’ve seen that with office space, right? With the work at home phenomena. We’ve seen it with retail, with, you know, the online shopping. These are things that are normal, that occur all the time, but ultimately, none of these trends, none of these developments, affect the root cause of the business cycle.
Maggie Lake 15:22
So what do you what signs would you be tracking to get a handle on whether we’re headed to recession? Because ideally, I would think you’d want to be in front of that in terms of your portfolio. So how do you predict, or try to figure out a forecast whether we’re actually in a recession? Yeah,
Chris Casey 15:40
well, because the theory is focusing on the impact of money and then it’s the secondary effect upon interest rates. Those are the two two factors we’re looking at. So we’re looking at my supply, year over year. My supply, this is kind of what we have in our dashboard, right? What’s, what’s going on with year over year money supply? And if you look at a graph, what you’ll see is that my supply obviously exploded out of the 2020 crisis and the lockdowns, and we were running, I think, year over year, growth of like 35% at one point, right? It was just astronomical. The average, just to put in perspective, is probably around seven to 10. Well, that then dropped, let’s say in October. I believe 23 went negative and went negative for longest period in history, outside of the Great Depression. So that’s one factor. We’re always looking at money supply, the changes in year over year growth. What we don’t want to see is either a flat lining of previous monetary growth or a dramatic downturn. The second one, and it’s not just what we look at, it’s actually what the Federal Reserve looks at, is the yield curve. And the yield curve is just a graphical depiction of various interest rates through different maturities, and a common way to measure so called flatness, or how steep it is, would be looking at what they call 10s over twos. So you look at like, for instance, the 10 year bond that rates over the two year bond, and if they’re about the same, let’s say they’re both 4% well then you have a very flat rate, right? That’s you have a flat interest curve, interest rate curve. That’s another factor. Not only I mentioned, not only do we look at it, but the Federal Reserve has come out and said this is the best metric for determining inflation, or, I’m sorry, determining recessions. And if you look at the studies, they have a whole host of studies, especially by the New York Fed, on this topic. And they would say that since 1950 there’s only been one false positive. So it’s only one time you’ve had an inverted yield curve, flat curve for that actually inverted right? The rates that are closest to maturity are the ones with the highest rates, versus 10 years or out farther. They would say since 1950 there’s only been one false positive where you had an inverted yield curve and it suggested there was an economic downturn. We had weakness, but it wasn’t recession. And here’s another key, there’s been no false positives. So we have yet to have recession without an inverted yield curve preceding it. So I think those two metrics are things that we look at now. Timing is difficult, right? Because, as I mentioned, we’ve had a very inverted Neil yield curve or flat for some time. We’ve had monetary growth that has been seriously contracted over the last couple of years. Has gone on far longer than I thought without seeing cracks in the economy. But those are the signals we’re primarily looking,
Maggie Lake 18:19
primarily looking at one of the, one of the things that’s that’s kind of re entered the conversation after having been absent for a really long time is the impact of fiscal with that, right? So if you’re looking at money supply and the shape of the yield curve, a lot of people are saying, well, hang on now we have to take into account the fiscal side of things, is that a piece of it or not as much
Chris Casey 18:45
it definitely is, but I’d say more of kind of an indirect route. So for instance, right now, we’re probably going to run a two or $3 trillion deficit for this year, which is mind boggling to me, after we expected some cuts of anything right in spending. So the fiscal what happens there is, once you have a deficit, well, who’s going to make up for that deficit? If it’s not free market buyers of us, treasuries, right? If it’s not the Chinese, Japanese, etc, coming in, it’s not, you know, funds and us, what have you, it’s always the Federal Reserve is the the backstop, right? They’re always the ones are out buying bonds. We’ve seen this time and time and again. That’s why their balance sheet has exploded since 2008 but especially since the the lockdowns. So fiscal situation plays a dramatic impact, but it’s more of a secondary it’s more of a secondary fact of of influencing the money supply, rather than any other effect that that’s out there.
Maggie Lake 19:40
So one other, when we’re talking about the potential of false positives, and again, this isn’t under the context of this is has the business cycle is a huge track record that that you can follow, you know, as a guide, but we always seem to be having a conversation of, are we getting it right or. Do the model still work? Are the signals in place, or has something significantly changed? What about credit spreads? This is another issue that’s come up as the debate has gone on about the economy, and we’ve seen what had been pretty tight credit spreads for a long time. Is that Is that something that should be part of a dashboard when we’re trying to figure out what’s happening with the recession, or is that something that you look at less now? Well, I
Chris Casey 20:24
think it is something that’s important. It’s not. It doesn’t tie in, like my supply or the inverted yield curve directly to the progression of Austrian economic theory, right? So, but it is a, what I would call a secondary factor. It’s a good confirming indicator, I guess, if you will, once you see credit spreads, and by that we just mean various types of bonds, how they’re priced relative to, you know, T bills or treasuries, what have you once those rates are significant, there’s significant premium to those the yields on those other bonds. That is definitely a bad indicator, and we’re seeing that a little bit right now. Credit yield, credit spreads have widened substantially. They’re still fairly low in a grand scheme of things, but they have widened substantially over the last couple of months. So that’s kind of I’d say maybe the final type of indicator we’re looking at it is if they increase much more than this, I would consider that very disturbing and imminent sign of potential recession.
Maggie Lake 21:21
All right, so if we, if we have that on our dashboard, and it’s something that we need to be tracking and asking, you know, as we sit down, and we should be checking our portfolios all the time, I think that’s the, that’s the sort of new reality that we’re in, we should be thinking about, where are we in the business cycle, and am I adequately positioned for that. So what? What, what works and what do we need to be thinking about in terms of the business cycle? What are some of the questions that you should be asking yourself in terms of what you’re holding? Yeah,
Chris Casey 21:52
I think it’s not so much what you want to own versus what you want to avoid. So I would avoid, as we mentioned, in the progression of the way the cycle plays out. Cyclical companies are hurt much more so than consumer goods companies. So right there, I would avoid anything I would consider cyclical. And they’ve, they have studies on this too. They do get hurt much more in a stock market downturn and so called, you know, consumer type companies. So I would avoid that. I would, I would be very careful, because typically when you have liquidity crisis, which you have whenever there’s a big downturn, whether it’s due to margin calls, what have you, there’s a scramble for cash. The demand for money increases substantially. And you’ll see this, right? Everything kind of sells off at least immediately, even gold, even things that you may think are not impacted by an economic downturn, will be hit. And so I think it’s a great time to husband resources. It’s a great time to just be safe rather than look at necessarily as a way to make money. I would definitely avoid cyclicals, and I’d be very nervous about the where interest rates are headed in that type of scenario,
Maggie Lake 22:59
is there, is there a category that is interest rate sensitive? I mean, if we are, you know what? How do we need to think about that? I think we understand sick cyclicals, what things tend to be really sensitive to interest rates? Well,
Chris Casey 23:12
cyclicals would be there too, in every environments, a little bit different, right? But historically, you would argue that things like gold or other commodities are impacted negatively by high rates or benefit by lower rates, right? Because the opportunity cost of holding them isn’t as significant. Obviously, bonds are highly sensitive to interest rate fluctuations, so that’s why, as a firm, you know, things we’ve been avoiding for last couple of years actually are long dated bonds we’re not going to go out and buy. Be very easy. A lot of wealth managers do it, right? They just go out and buy 10 year bonds and they sit on a bond fund for that time period. That’s, I think, a very dangerous game if you’re heading into a recession and you’re expecting higher interest rates. So that’s another
Maggie Lake 23:52
area I would avoid. And what about you just said that there is a scramble for cash. Do we need to? I think this is harder, harder to just figure out by looking at a broad sector on a broad sector basis, what about companies that have a lot of debt, carry a lot of debt as you’re heading into recession? Or, you know, we know, listen, we embrace the startup nation here, right? And so, but to do that, you often are not your revenues are a lot lower. You’re not even making a profit. Do you have to? How do you think about that? And, yeah,
Chris Casey 24:28
so like venture funds affect, you know, startups there’s certainly hit. You know, I neglected to mention, it’s a good point. Any any heavily indebted company, is going to potentially be hurt, right for a couple reasons, not just because interest rates may move against them, but just because they’re that much closer to bankruptcy than any of the servicing that debt than other companies would be. So you want to avoid companies in the equity markets that either have high degree of operating leverage, which are cyclical companies typically, or they have a high degree of financial. Coverage, or both, both is like, the one thing you should definitely avoid any kind of economic downturn.
Maggie Lake 25:05
Yeah, that’s why you got to pay attention to these earnings calls and dig into the financials. It doesn’t get easy when you’re when you’re trying to, sort of, I think, like, increase your quality right as you’re heading into something like that. And it’s not, is it? Is it fair to say that if you feel like a recession is coming, that you have to be super defensive? I mean, you know, this isn’t sort of all cash, right? You just have to, you just want to reduce your risk where possible. How would you quantify that, that the posture that you should have going into if you feel like we’re on the on the cusp of a recession?
Chris Casey 25:42
Yeah, no, I totally agree with that. With the latter point, it’s, you don’t go to all cash. We get plenty of calls from people that have literally gold cash, and that’s it, right? That’s all they’re holding on to. And and we always say we tend to view that as a very negative type of action, is, unless you time it perfectly, which no one’s going to everything is a matter of probabilities. So I would say, if you’re concerned about a recession, if you see these signs they’re developing, you definitely want to cut back on things that you have exposure to it, but you don’t do it day one, right? You you do it, and to the extent the signal becomes more pronounced strengthened, you keep cutting back. So going to 0% equities, I don’t think is ever healthy, but if you think recession is coming, going 20 30% absolutely, that makes a lot of sense. Yeah,
Maggie Lake 26:29
that does make sense there. I just want to end on this point, because, again, I think it’s really important to sort of sometimes go back to the basics and just make sure we understand what a business cycle is. There are some people, and you see this kind of stuff on social media, especially on X saying that, Oh, well, you know, the we’re in an environment. They’re critical of it, mind you, but we’re an environment where we’re not allowed to have recessions anymore. The government’s going to make sure we don’t have recessions, or the Fed is going to blink, or there’s a pal put, or there’s a Trump put, or, you know, they’re going to do whatever they need to cushion it. And we’ve, you know, gotten away from, what is it a sort of natural ebb and flow of the economy? Do you buy that? Well,
Chris Casey 27:09
in some to some extent, they’re correct, and that, you know, the Federal Reserve, it’s a pretty well known fact that they always talk about having a dual mandate, right? And reality is, I don’t even know why they say that it’s really a triple mandate, because it’s reasonable, interest rates, price level, unemployment, those are three things we’re supposed to be monitoring, but they also have other things unannounced agenda items, right? So one of them is propping up the stock market. I think it’s pretty evident they do that. That’s something they should not be involved in. But as far as people commenting, there’s going to be a put they they do if they can, but they can’t always do that. So for instance, I could see a position where the fiscal situation in us is so bad over next couple years that maybe they can’t go to the drawing board and have massive deficits, start printing a whole bunch of money. Maybe they’re just maybe we have inflation. They can’t print money. So there are things that would stop that. As far as the overall sentiment that that it’s now is different. You can go back in history and look at every single bubble and find people, most famously, I believe, would be Irving Fisher, noted economist, right around the turn of 19th, 20th century. And he famously said something to the fact of I think it was like 1929 he literally said this, stocks have reached a permanent plateau, like he had that kind of comment. So this is not a new sentiment. You know, nothing’s changed about the nature of our species. Nothing’s changed about basic economic rules and laws and facts. And therefore, until that changes, nothing’s ever fixed and determinative and different than the previous bubble?
Maggie Lake 28:44
Yeah, great. Great to be a student of history and also to understand the fundamentals. Chris, thanks so much for this. I think it’s a really timely reminder of a sort of area of the market that we really need to make sure that we understand. So appreciate the refresher. You’re
Chris Casey 28:57
welcome. Thanks for having me on.
